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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
Mennen, Inc. appeals the district court's dismissal, for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of its complaint against 
Federal Insurance Company. For the reasons set forth 
below, we affirm. 
 
I. 
 
This litigation commenced in 1993 when Mennen, a New 
Jersey corporation, brought suit in the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey against several of its insurers-- 
all of them incorporated and having their principal places of 
business outside of New Jersey--seeking indemnity under 
state law for environmental clean-up liabilities. Mennen's 
complaint based federal jurisdiction on the diversity 
statute. 28 U.S.C. S 1332. Mennen did not initially name 
appellee Federal Insurance Co. ("Federal") as a defendant 
because Mennen believed that Federal--a company 
incorporated in Indiana--had its principal place of business 
in New Jersey, thus precluding diversity jurisdiction. 
Moreover, when Mennen filed suit, New Jersey insurance 
law was governed by a joint and several liability regime--a 
regime which appeared to permit Mennen to seek full 
recovery from its other insurers without suing Federal. 
While the suit was pending, however, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court decided Owens-Illinois v. United Insurance 
Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994), which eliminated joint and several 
liability in cases involving several insurers and substituted 
a pro rata contribution scheme. The practical effect of the 
Owens-Illinois decision with respect to this litigation was 
that, if Mennen was to have the complete recovery it 
sought, it would be necessary for Mennen to secure the 
joinder of Federal as a party defendant. 
 
Mennen's first step was to move to compel the defendants 
to implead Federal. But this stratagem proved 
unsuccessful; the motion was denied. Then Mennen 
discovered pleadings that Federal had filed in other actions 
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--pleadings in which Federal stated that its principal place 
of business was in Indiana, its state of incorporation. 
Armed with this new understanding of Federal's business 
operations, Mennen filed an amended complaint joining 
Federal as a defendant. Federal responded by moving that 
it be dismissed as a defendant for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Federal contended that its principal place of 
business was in New Jersey, and hence that, for the 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, it was a citizen of New 
Jersey as well as of Indiana; this meant, so Federal argued, 
that there was a New Jersey plaintiff (Mennen) and a New 
Jersey defendant (Federal), a configuration fatal to diversity 
jurisdiction. Mennen opposed the motion to dismiss, 
arguing that Federal was a citizen of Indiana only. 1 The 
district court, concluding that Federal's principal place of 
business was indeed New Jersey, granted Federal's motion. 
This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The facts bearing on jurisdiction are undisputed. Federal 
is a corporation wholly owned by the Chubb Corporation. 
For the first approximately ninety years of its existence, 
Federal was incorporated in New Jersey. Since 1990, 
however, Federal has been incorporated in Indiana. The 
corporation has an office in Indiana designated as its 
"Statutory Home Office" in fulfillment of a requirement of 
Indiana law. 
 
Federal is in the business of providing property and 
casualty insurance in the United States and abroad. 
Although a great deal of the company's activity is carried on 
domestically, Federal itself has no employees in the United 
States.2 Rather, Federal's business in the United States is 
conducted by employees of Chubb & Son, another wholly- 
owned subsidiary of the Chubb Corporation, under a 
management services contract. Pursuant to similar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mennen also filed a motion for sanctions against Federal on the basis 
of these inconsistent pleadings, a motion the district court denied. 
Mennen has not appealed this ruling. 
 
2. Federal does have some employees, but it appears that all of them 
work in Asia. 
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arrangements, many of these employees also handle the 
business of other Chubb Corporation affiliates. 
 
In New Jersey, some two thousand Chubb & Son 
employees conduct Federal's business. Specifically, 
Federal's national underwriting and claims-handling 
functions are administered by Chubb & Son personnel at 
an office complex in Warren, New Jersey. As the district 
court found and the record reflects, the Warren office also 
(1) houses Federal's accounting, treasury, marketing, 
investment, human resources, and loss-control 
departments; (2) is the location of the majority of Federal's 
"senior executives;"3 and (3) is the situs for the filing of 
Federal's tax returns, policy forms, and annual reports. 
 
In Indiana, forty-five Chubb & Son employees carry out 
Federal's business. As Indiana law requires of companies 
incorporated in the state, Federal's primary books and 
records are maintained at the Indiana office. However, the 
Indiana office functions largely as a local claims and 
underwriting office, similar to other such local offices 
throughout the country; no national corporate-wide 
authority over such functions is exercised in Indiana. 
 
Mennen does not undertake to challenge the district 
court's factual findings. Rather, Mennen argues that--given 
that Federal has no employees in New Jersey--Federal is 
only a citizen of Indiana, its state of incorporation, and that 
the district court therefore erred in concluding that subject 
matter jurisdiction is absent. We exercise plenary review 
over this issue. Mellon Bank v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1220 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. While the record is not entirely clear as to which officers the term 
"senior executives" encompasses, it appears likely that the term refers to 
Federal's elected officers--the president and board chair, senior vice 
presidents, and vice presidents. Of Federal's appointed officers-- 
assistant vice presidents, assistant secretaries, and assistant treasurers 
--a plurality are located in New Jersey. Only one appointed officer is 
located in Indiana. The remainder are assigned to other cities in the 
United States or to Federal's "Asia Pacific Zonal Office." None of the 
officers within the United States is an employee of Federal. 
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III. 
 
A. 
 
Section 1332(a)(1) of the diversity statute requires 
complete diversity between the parties--that is, jurisdiction 
is lacking if any plaintiff and any defendant are citizens of 
the same state. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
267 (1806). The determination of a corporation's citizenship 
was a matter of some doubt until Congress in 1958 
amended 28 U.S.C. S 1332 by adding a sub-section (c)(1), 
which provided, in relevant part, that "a corporation shall 
be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been 
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal 
place of business."4 Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85- 
554, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. S 1332(c)(1)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Diversity jurisdiction was statutorily authorized by Section 11 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, but the statute was silent on the 
subject of corporations. Initially, the Supreme Court, reasoning that a 
corporation could not itself be a citizen, held that whether a corporation 
could sue in diversity depended on the citizenship"of the individuals 
who compose the corporation." Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 
(5 Cranch) 61, 92 (1809). Deveaux had the effect of markedly restraining 
the use of diversity jurisdiction in litigation involving corporations. 
"As a 
result of the decision, the reports of the Supreme Court and the Circuit 
Courts during the forty years thereafter reveal an almost complete 
absence of cases in which corporations (other than banking and 
insurance) were litigants . . . ." 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in 
United States History 390-91 (1926); see also Richard H. Fallon, Daniel 
J. Meltzer, & Richard L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 1535 (4th ed. 1996). Thirty-five years after 
Deveaux the Court changed course in Louisville, Cincinnati & 
Charlestown R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844), in 
which it held that a corporation "is entitled . . . to be deemed" a 
citizen 
of the state that created it. A decade later, in Marshall v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854), the Court arrived at the 
Letson result but through different reasoning. In an apparent effort to 
reconcile Deveaux and Letson, the Marshall Court held that although a 
corporation cannot be a citizen, the persons who make up the 
corporation "may be justly presumed to be resident in the State which 
is the necessary habitat of the corporation, and where alone they can be 
made subject to suit; and should be estopped in equity from averring a 
different domicil." 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 328; see also Ohio & Mississippi 
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One of Congress's main purposes in enacting S 1332(c)(1) 
was to curtail the availability of diversity jurisdiction. See S. 
Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 
1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101 ("In adopting this legislation, 
the committee feels . . . that it will ease the workload of our 
Federal courts by reducing the number of cases involving 
corporations which come into Federal district courts on the 
fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists."). 
 
Mennen is a citizen of New Jersey. Federal, incorporated 
in Indiana, was determined by the district court to have its 
principal place of business in New Jersey, making Federal 
a citizen of New Jersey as well. The district court thus 
found complete diversity lacking and dismissed the 
complaint with respect to Federal. Consequently, this 
appeal turns on whether the district court erred as a matter 
of law in concluding that Federal's principal place of 
business is in New Jersey. 
 
B. 
 
In this circuit, the key authority interpretingS 1332(c)(1) 
is Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 
1960). The Kelly articulation of standards for determining a 
company's principal place of business has come to be 
known as the "center of corporate activities" test for 
corporate citizenship. See generally 13B Charles Alan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
R. R. v. Wheeler, 66 (1 Black) U.S. 286, 296 (1862) (explicating 
Marshall). 
Whether the Letson view or that expressed in Marshall doctrinally carried 
the day until the amendment of the diversity statute in 1958 remains a 
matter of historical debate. Compare Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 
458, 461 n.7 (1980)("[Marshall] view endured until 1958"), and United 
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 
148 (1965) (characterizing the Marshall formulation as a "compromise 
destined to endure for over a century"), with Carden v. Arkoma 
Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 194 n.3 (1990)(" Marshall's fictional approach 
appears to have been abandoned. Later cases revert to the formulation 
of [Letson] that the corporation has its own citizenship.")(citing Great 
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456 (1900), and 
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889)). See also National Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 618 n.12 
(1949)(Rutledge, J. concurring in the judgment). 
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Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure S 3625 (2d. ed. 1984 & Supp. 
1998)(hereinafter "Federal Practice and Procedure"). The 
Kelly inquiry, reaffirmed and refined in subsequent cases, 
requires courts to ascertain "the headquarters of day-to-day 
corporate activity and management." 284 F.2d at 854; see 
also Midlantic Nat. Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Quaker State Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. ITT, 
461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 
In Kelly, this court was called on to determine the 
principal place of business of the "giant" (284 F.2d at 854) 
United States Steel Corporation, which approximately forty 
years ago had fourteen divisions and eleven subsidiaries 
and whose "various manufacturing activities spread over 
practically all the United States and extend[ed] to foreign 
countries." Id. at 853. The plaintiffs in Kelly--seeking to 
overturn dismissals for lack of diversity jurisdiction--had 
urged a " `nerve center' " approach, according to which the 
locus of the board of directors' final decision-making 
authority would be determinative of the defendant 
corporation's principal place of business. Speaking through 
Judge Goodrich, the court characterized plaintiffs' proposed 
test as "a pleasant and alluring figure of speech," but then 
turned "to a consideration of the facts of the Steel 
Corporation's life." Id. Applying that pragmatic approach, 
the court noted that final authority over "corporate policy, 
including its financing," rested with the board in New York, 
but that the board had delegated "the duty of conducting 
the business of the corporation relating to manufacturing, 
mining, transportation and general operation" to an 
"Operation Policy Committee," consisting of the board 
chairman, the president, the seven executive vice 
presidents and certain other principal officers,"which sits 
and conducts its affairs" in Pennsylvania. Id. at 854. 
Further, the court pointed out that the seven executive vice 
presidents, sixteen of the seventeen administrative vice 
presidents, and twenty-two of the twenty-five vice 
presidents had their offices and staffs in Pennsylvania. 
Consequently, the court identified Pennsylvania as the state 
in which the corporation's "business by way of activities is 
centered." Id. 
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The Kelly court also looked to factors such as "physical 
location of employer's plants and the like"--factors which, 
while of "lesser importance," were of "some significance" 
when "added to the items already enumerated pointing to 
the center of corporate activity." Id. Specifically, the court 
noted that Pennsylvania had approximately a third of the 
company's personnel, tangible property, and productive 
capacity--far more than New York and, apparently, more 
than any other state. Id. 
 
In the present case, all of the Kelly factors--both the 
primary considerations and what in Quaker State Dyeing 
and Finishing Corp. v. ITT, 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 
1972), we referred to as the "secondary considerations"-- 
point to New Jersey. As between New Jersey and Indiana 
the choice is clear: the critical mass of corporate functions 
is located in the Warren offices. Warren is not only the 
center of Federal's national underwriting operations but 
also the location of its accounting, legal, human resource, 
and loss-control activities. There are more than two 
thousand Chubb & Son employees carrying out Federal's 
business--underwriting and providing insurance--in the 
Warren complex, where most of the company's officers are 
located. By contrast, forty-five Chubb & Son employees 
conduct Federal's business in the Indiana office, an office 
that has no corporation-wide authority. 
 
Hence a straightforward application of Kelly's principles 
leads to the conclusion that Federal's principal place of 
business is in New Jersey. Mennen, however, argues that 
this court's recent decision in Midlantic Nat. Bank v. 
Hansen, 48 F.3d 693 (3d Cir. 1995), has effected a sea- 
change in the principal-place-of-business inquiry in this 
circuit. Hansen dealt with the problem presented when a 
court is called upon to decide, for diversity purposes, the 
citizenship of a corporation which has become entirely 
inactive. In Hansen, the corporation in question--Midlantic 
National Bank--was a failed savings and loan. The 
Resolution Trust Corporation had seized Midlantic and 
prohibited it from conducting any further business. We 
concluded that in a situation of this sort it was not 
necessary to "strain to locate a principal place of business 
when no such place in reality exists." Id. at 696. Given that 
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the Kelly inquiry looks to actual business activities, we held 
in Hansen that a corporation not engaged in business 
activities can only be considered a citizen of its state of 
incorporation. Id. Hence our approach in Hansen does not 
represent a departure from this court's Kelly analysis, as 
Mennen's argument suggests, but a consistent application 
of Kelly's underlying premises.5  
 
Mennen acknowledges that Federal is not an inactive 
corporation but urges that we extend the logic of Hansen to 
this case. Stressing our statement that courts should not 
"strain to locate a principal place of business," Mennen 
argues that Hansen should apply here because of the 
unusual relationship between Mennen and Chubb & Son. 
Since Federal itself has no employees in the United States, 
but rather contracts out all of its underwriting and claims- 
handling functions to an affiliate, Mennen urges that 
Federal be treated as the functional equivalent of an 
inactive corporation for jurisdictional purposes. 
 
We decline Mennen's invitation to broaden the reach of 
our holding in Hansen. In adopting the "center of corporate 
activities" test in Kelly, this court opted for a functional 
approach to the principal place of business inquiry.6 Rather 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As we noted in Hansen, other circuits have taken different views in 
determining the citizenship of inactive corporations. Compare Wm. 
Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 
131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991)(last principal place of business dispositive), 
with 
Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992)(last 
principal place of business is relevant but not controlling). On the 
subject generally, see Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive Corporations and 
Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. S 1332(c): The Search for a 
Principal Place of Business, 28 U. Toledo L. Rev. 815 (1997); Dawn Levy, 
Note, Where Do Dead Corporations Live?: Determining the Citizenship of 
Inactive Corporations for Diversity Jurisdiction Purposes, 62 Brooklyn L. 
Rev. 663 (1996). 
 
6. As previously noted, this court in Kelly considered the "center of 
corporate activities" test a sounder guide than the "nerve center" test 
contended for by the Kelly plaintiffs-appellants. The "nerve center" test 
derives from the decision in Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 
F.Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The Scot Typewriter formulation placed 
emphasis on the highest levels of corporate decision making, looking to 
"the place where all of its business was under the supreme direction and 
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than looking to the location of the highest level of policy- 
making as dispositive, we looked to the location of 
production and "the headquarters of day-to-day corporate 
activity and management." 284 F.2d 854. In light of our 
stress on the pragmatic facts of corporate life as opposed to 
more formal lines of inquiry, we find it appropriate to 
consider the substantial quantity of Federal's activity 
carried out in New Jersey, notwithstanding that those who 
carry out Federal's business are not formally Federal 
employees. It is fully in line with this court's consistently 
functional approach to consider the actual day-to-day 
activities of Federal, irrespective of what corporation's name 
appears on the paychecks of the employees who carry out 
those activities.7 Accordingly, we reject Mennen's contention 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
control of its officers." Id. at 865 (footnote and internal quotation 
marks 
omitted). Courts and commentators have since noted that the two 
approaches are not necessarily antagonistic. See, e.g., Merino de Walker 
v. Pueblo Intern., Inc., 569 F.2d 1169, 1171 (1st Cir. 1978); Egan v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1963); 13B Federal 
Practice and Procedure S 3625 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1998). Several 
courts have more recently embraced a "total activities" test, which 
synthesizes the two approaches. See, e.g., Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 
997 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1993); J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 
401, 406 (5th Cir. 1987); Vareka Invs., N.V. v. American Inv. Properties, 
Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 910 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). 
Whether and to what extent the "nerve center" test as it would be 
applied today differs in a meaningful way from the Kelly test is not a 
question that needs to be resolved in the case at bar. To the extent that 
the tests appear to differ, at least as a matter of emphasis, the outcome 
of this appeal would be the same under either approach. 
 
7. Mennen also urges that the district court's conclusion impermissibly 
disregards the separate corporate identities of Federal and Chubb & Son. 
In aid of this argument, Mennen points to a plethora of cases holding 
that parents and subsidiaries each have their own principal places of 
business. This argument need not detain us long. The cases cited by 
Mennen are typified by Quaker State Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. ITT, 
461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972), which held that"a subsidiary 
corporation which is incorporated as a separate entity from its parent 
corporation is considered to have its own principal place of business." 
(quoting 1 Moore's Federal Practice 717.10, S 0.77). As Federal points 
out, 
this is indeed an "unremarkable proposition" and one that has no 
relevance in this case. Quaker State Dyeing simply instructs that a 
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that the district court erred in taking into account the 
activities of Chubb & Son employees, who, pursuant to a 
management services contract, carry out the practical work 
of Federal. 
 
Mennen also urges that we give weight to Federal's 
assertions, in unrelated litigation, that its principal place of 
business is in Indiana. Collecting an array of pleadings filed 
by Federal in other proceedings in which Federal was a 
party defendant, Mennen contends that these 
representations provide valuable evidence indicating where 
Federal's corporate representatives believe the corporation's 
principal place of business to be.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
subsidiary has its own principal place of business unless there is some 
abuse of corporate form that would allow the court to look through the 
juridical separation between the corporations and therefore regard the 
parent's principal place of business as that of the subsidiary. The 
district 
court in this case did not attribute Chubb & Son's principal place of 
business to Federal; rather, it examined those activities of Federal 
(albeit 
carried out by employees of the affiliated corporation), and determined 
that Federal had its own principal place of business in New Jersey. Thus 
the district court was not imputing one affiliate's principal place of 
business to another. Rather, the district court attributed to Federal the 
services that Chubb & Son operatives perform on behalf of Federal, 
which, as we here hold, is proper in this instance. 
 
8. Specifically, Mennen points to the following: (1) Campbell v. New 
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., No. L-233693, an insurance coverage action filed 
in the New Jersey Superior Court in 1996. The plaintiff in Campbell, 
responding to Federal's argument that the action was barred by the 
entire controversy doctrine, urged that it was not possible to join 
Federal 
in the earlier federal court proceeding because Federal's New Jersey 
citizenship would have destroyed diversity. Federal's reply brief 
maintained that the corporation's principal place of business was in 
Indiana. Federal later submitted a correction (after the underlying 
controversy had settled), indicating that this representation was in error 
and that the company's principal place of business was in New Jersey. 
(2) In Gencorp v. Adriatic Ins. Co., No. 95-2464, a 1995 case in the 
Northern District of Ohio, Federal stated in its original answer that its 
principal place of business was in Indiana. Federal subsequently moved 
for leave to amend the answer, stating that the original answer 
misidentified the company's principal place of business as being in 
Indiana when it was in fact in New Jersey. (3) In Mercury Fin. Co. v. 
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We do not find that these prior Federal pleadings have 
evidentiary value for the purpose of assessing where 
Federal's principal place of business is located. The 
representations made in these pleadings run contrary to 
the empirical facts with which the jurisdictional inquiry is 
concerned. While pleadings that contain unwarranted 
assertions as to matters bearing on jurisdiction reflect no 
great credit on the attorneys who apparently drafted and 
filed them without sufficient inquiry, the pleadings 
themselves have no intrinsic capacity either to establish or 
disestablish jurisdiction; it is axiomatic that a party may 
not confer or defeat jurisdiction by mere pleading. See 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702(1982); Owen Equipment & 
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978). 
Rather, subject matter jurisdiction depends upon facts of 
record, and when any question arises as to the existence of 
jurisdiction a federal court is obligated to make an 
independent determination of those facts. See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."); 
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1939).9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Aetna Cas. Co., 900 F. Supp. 390, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1995), the court 
(presumably on the representation of Federal's counsel) identified 
Indiana as the location of Federal's principal place of business. In both 
Gencorp and Mercury, whether Federal was a citizen of New Jersey as 
well as Indiana appears to have been immaterial; diversity would not 
have been defeated in either case if New Jersey had been considered 
Federal's principal place of business. Mennen also cites a number of 
other pleadings, which, although not free of ambiguity, present no stark 
inconsistency with Federal's argument in this action that its principal 
place of business is in New Jersey. 
 
9. In its reply brief, Mennen makes an oblique suggestion that Federal 
may be held to its prior representations. Although Mennen avoids overt 
invocation of "estoppel"--the term of art that seems most aptly to 
describe its argument--Mennen appears in effect to be urging that 
Federal be bound to those jurisdictional contentions. 
 
In support of this argument, Mennen relies upon DiFrischia v. New 
York Central Railroad, 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960), in which this court, 
while acknowledging the general precept that jurisdiction may not be 
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(Text continued on page 16) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bestowed or waived by action of parties, held that the defendant was 
bound to its representation as to federal jurisdiction, despite a factual 
lack of diversity. In DiFrischia, the defendant had stipulated to 
jurisdiction early in the litigation, but then moved to dismiss after the 
expiration of the relevant limitations period. On these extreme facts, 
this 
court determined that the district court had abused its discretion in 
dismissing the action, stating that "a defendant may not play fast and 
loose with the judicial machinery and deceive the courts." 279 F.2d at 
144. 
 
In the two decades that followed, the holding in DiFrischia failed to 
draw broad support. With one exception, every circuit court called upon 
to apply DiFrischia either distinguished or voiced disapproval of the 
decision. See, e.g., Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(DiFrischia, is applicable, if at all, only on its "unusual facts"); 
Eisler v. 
Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 151 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976)(noting that DiFrischia is 
"plainly inconsistent with governing Supreme Court authorities"); Basso 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974)(holding 
DiFrischia distinguishable even though defendant did not raise 
jurisdictional defect until adverse judgment was rendered); see also 13 
Federal Practice and Procedure S 3522 at 50 (1st ed. 1975)("the 
significance of the case as a general precedent is dubious."). Nor was 
this 
reluctance to find occasion for applying the DiFrischia rule confined to 
circuits other than our own. See, e.g., Joyce v. United States, 474 F.2d 
215, 218 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973); Stapleton v. $2,438,110, 454 F.2d 1210, 
1218 (3d Cir. 1972); Ramsey v. Mellon Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 350 F.2d 
874, 879 (3d Cir. 1965); see also Eisler, 535 F.2d at 152 ("We note that 
DiFrischia has not proved to be a particularly generative inroad on the 
traditional rule, even in the Third Circuit."). 
 
The lone exception to this disinclination on the part of other circuit 
courts to follow DiFrischia was the Eighth Circuit in Kroger v. Owen 
Equipment & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977). That case 
presented the Eighth Circuit with facts similar to those that moved this 
court in DiFrischia to find an exception to the general rule against 
creating jurisdiction by estoppel. The jurisdictional issue in Kroger 
turned on the citizenship of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. ("Owen"), 
which was brought into the action under Rule 14 by the original 
defendant. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to state claims directly 
against Owen, and by the time of trial Owen was the only party 
defendant in the case. The amended complaint alleged that Owen was a 
Nebraska corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska, 
an allegation Owen never directly disputed; rather Owen issued a general 
denial qualified by an admission that it was "'a corporation organized 
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and existing under the Laws of the State of Nebraska.' " 558 F.2d at 419. 
On the third day of trial, however, (well after the statute of limitations 
had run) Owen challenged jurisdiction, asserting that its principal place 
of business was in fact in Iowa, the state in which the plaintiff was 
domiciled. The district court rejected the challenge, and a divided panel 
of the Eighth Circuit affirmed, giving substantial weight to DiFrischia. 
558 F.2d at 425-26 & nn.33-34. 
 
DiFrischia's moment of recognition as a vital precedent was short-lived. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's Kroger decision in 
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), holding 
that a district court, in a diversity case, may not exercise ancillary 
jurisdiction over a state-law controversy between citizens of the same 
state. In doing so, the Court noted that "the asserted inequity in the 
respondent's alleged concealment of its citizenship is irrelevant. Federal 
judicial power does not depend upon `prior action or consent of the 
parties.' " Id. at 377 n.21 (quoting American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 
341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951). 
 
After over two decades of carefully stepping around DiFrischia, this 
court was presented, in Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1984), 
with an occasion to revisit DiFrischia in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Owen Equipment. Rubin involved the kind of fact pattern that 
moved this court to the result in DiFrischia and the Eighth Circuit to its 
conclusion in Kroger. Rubin, alleging that he was a Hong Kong citizen, 
filed a diversity action against Buckman. However, after the district 
court granted Buckman's motion for summary judgment on the merits, 
Rubin filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no 
diversity; in that motion Rubin revealed that he was not in fact a citizen 
of Hong Kong. The district court--holding that DiFrischia was 
distinguishable--granted the motion, vacated its judgment, and 
dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, Buckman urged that Rubin should 
have been bound to his jurisdictional allegation. Rejecting this argument, 
this court explicitly repudiated DiFrischia. The Rubin opinion emphasized 
that two intervening Supreme Court decisions--Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 9 
(1982), and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 
(1978)--made it clear that "jurisdiction cannot be created by estoppel, 
even as a sanction for conduct such as that here or in DiFrischia." 727 
F.2d at 72. Because of this inconsistency with Supreme Court precedent, 
the panel held that DiFrischia "can no longer be regarded as the law of 
this circuit." 727 F.2d at 72. One post-Rubin opinion of this court 
parenthetically mentions the holding in DiFrischia in a footnote, but the 
DiFrischia holding was not characterized by the court as being germane 
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Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court is affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to any issue it was called upon to decide. Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 
1132, 1139 n.16 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
One might well think that our strong disavowal of the DiFrischia 
holding in Rubin had put the matter to rest, at least as a live legal 
issue 
in this circuit. Mennen argues, however, that Rubin's report of 
DiFrischia's demise was exaggerated. The Rubin panel, so Mennen urges, 
was without power to overturn DiFrischia because Rule 9.1 of this court's 
Internal Operating Procedures (IOP) provides that only an in banc 
decision can overturn a prior panel's opinion. 
 
To be sure, IOP 9.1 prohibits a panel of this court from overruling a 
holding of a prior panel expressed in a published opinion. However, this 
rule gives way when the prior panel's holding is in conflict with Supreme 
Court precedent. See Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 
F.3d 258, 266 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995). Judge Garth, in his Rubin 
concurrence, wrote separately for the very purpose of emphasizing this 
point. See Rubin, 727 F.2d at 74 (Garth, J., concurring)("Because the 
rule in DiFrischia is obviously in conflict with Supreme Court precedent, 
I agree that it should be overruled, and that our action in rejecting 
DiFrischia may be accomplished without the necessity of an in banc 
hearing."). 
 
Mennen, however, struggles to save its argument by asserting that the 
exception to this court's bar against intra-circuit conflicts applies only 
when an intervening Supreme Court opinion calls for rejection of a prior 
panel's holding. Mennen reasons that because Supreme Court cases 
preceding DiFrischia consistently held that federal jurisdiction could not 
be bestowed by consent or estoppel--and Owen Equipment is consistent 
with Supreme Court decisions predating DiFrischia--our DiFrischia 
opinion must be regarded as governing circuit law until the full court 
overturns it. Neither logic nor our case law supports this position. 
 
Supreme Court cases long predating DiFrischia  certainly made its 
holding at least doubtful from the outset. See American Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake 
Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). The Rubin court 
acknowledged as much in its decision. 727 F.2d at 72 n.1. However, this 
acknowledgment made DiFrischia a stronger candidate for overturning 
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without the need for rehearing by the full court, not a weaker one. We 
reject the proposition that a panel opinion which lacks harmony not only 
with subsequent Supreme Court authority but also with antecedent 
Supreme Court authority has a greater claim to permanence as circuit 
precedent than a panel decision undercut by subsequent Supreme Court 
authority but apparently not in tension with Supreme Court authority 
when announced. 
 
It need hardly be added that our decisions interpreting the relevant 
IOP rule neither state nor imply the limiting principle for which Mennen 
contends. The very case that Mennen cites as supportive of its rather 
implausible reading of the rule--Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 
113, 120 (3d Cir. 1985)--approvingly quotes Judge Garth's concurrence 
in Rubin, which itself noted the tension between the DiFrischia holding 
and Supreme Court authority of both early and late vintage. See 727 
F.2d at 74 (Garth, J., concurring). The fact that most cases in which we 
have applied the exception speak in terms of intervening decisions merely 
shows (what should be unsurprising) that it is the rare circuit court 
decision that is inconsistent with the weight of antecedent Supreme 
Court precedent. 
 
With all charity, it should be observed that although the principle that 
jurisdiction cannot be waived or established by consent had been firmly 
established before DiFrischia was decided, the Supreme Court had yet to 
render a decision in a case presenting the rather extreme circumstances 
that this court confronted in DiFrischia. Hence reasonable minds could 
have concluded (and did conclude) that a party who had willfully 
concealed the absence of jurisdiction early in litigation would not be 
heard to assert the jurisdictional defect later in the proceedings. The 
advent of the Supreme Court's decision in Owen Equipment--which 
reversed the only circuit court opinion that embraced and applied the 
DiFrischia rule--certainly removed any lingering doubt on that score. 
Consequently, the Rubin panel's disavowal of DiFrischia can hardly be 
deemed to be outside of the panel's authority. Rather, the panel in Rubin 
did this court yeomanly service by laying to rest a rule that had already 
long been moribund. We will not undertake to revive it now. 
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